Nog een paar regeltjes Yesha voor 't slapen gaan.

The belief of some critics that Leibowitz was inconsistent in that respect stems from their taking it for granted that autonomy must be valuable in itself. Certainly nothing in YL's views is inconsistent with regard for freedom from external coercion (IB's negative freedom) as a most important instrumental value - a basic condition for the possibility of men's striving to realize any value whatsoever. Few of the author's contentions have been as confusing to his readers & audiences as the often reiterated statement that morality is an atheistic category. If so, how to account for the moral criticism to which much of his writings is devoted? To a certain extent, such statements may be attributed to his penchant for shocking formulations. It may reflect Y's failure to organize his ethical theorizing systematically. However, careful study of the contexts in which morality & religion are presented as conflicting should make Y's position more plausible. He is not claiming that a religious person cannot be a moral agent.

At no point does he maintain that religious demands upon the person or the community are total in the sense of all-inclusive. On many matters the Halakhah is silent. At such points, moral considerations may very well come interplay & ought to govern one's actions. The immorality of a religious person under such circumstances may even reflect upon his religiosity & constitute what is called Hillul Hashem, desecration of G d's name. Y does insist that a person acting as a moral agent cannot be acting as a religious agent & that a religious action cannot be a moral action simultaneously. This is a corollary of his view that human actions, as contrasted with natural events, can only be identified in terms of the agent's intention. The morality of an action is determined not by it's consequences (though these enter into moral deliberation) but by the agent's intention to perform his duty. The religious character of an action is determinedly the motive of worshipful service to G d. The same external act may on one occasion be moral & on another occasion be religious, depending upon the agent's motivation. The idea of a religious duty to act morally when this seems to be required would not be in contradiction of Y's basic position, even if it may not be consonant with some of his formulations. A moral act done out of respect for religious duty would be a religious act. The person's proximate motive would be moral, but his ultimate motive religious. The intrinsic ultimacy of the religious motive is the point Y is trying to bring out. It makes one think, to say the least.